This post is a reponse to a very nice blog post by a friend. You can find it here.

When one speaks of “spiritual experiences” or “religious experiences” what comes to mind? Often we discount religious experience as nothing more that excessive emotional rambling, mysticism, ritualism, or blatant lies that reinforce a false hope. I don’t particularly buy these claims, but they do act as the standard dismissal for most atheists or a-theologians.

In the aforementioned blog article, the author discusses these claims generally by pointing out several issues that he has with religious experience, and its seemingly non-justified position among the dictums of proof.

His points are as follows:

1)

Religious experiences tend to be culturally specific and socially influenced. Most people’s religious experiences tend to lead them to believe in either the religion they were raised in, or the religion of their friends. Our feelings in general tend to be strongly influenced by our peers, and religious feelings seem to be the same.

This is reasonable and acceptable. I think there is little debate to be had about the claim that human interaction and belief structures are strongly influenced by association, but how does this not provide evidence for the existence of God? Is it possible that the only way to come to a personal knowledge of God’s existence may be via some type of person-specific reality? I mean, given that God may exist outside of our observable universe or (as I hold) that we are likely to exist in some type of Turing-type world that is largely digital, personal experience may be the only way to adequately transcend the bounds of the observable world or create a nexus amid our reality and that of God’s. Additionally, you can really never know if the experience a person is having is not some type of Gettier-like situation that just happens to be correct -which, while by accident, the person does have of evidence.

I would also call upon the works of Joseph Campbell and his comparative mythologies. He was able to demonstrate that mythologies and religion do map to common elements: things like eternal life, Deity, and other supernatural conditions [1]. So, if all religious experence are rooted in a set of basic common elements, is it not possible that maybe those things are similar to any other type of basic truth or trivial piece of scientific evidence? Arguably, it would seem as such.

2)

Religious experiences often contradict each other. If you think one religion is right, you have to admit that most people’s religious experiences lead them to the wrong conclusion. Even people who have been exposed to the “right” religion have experiences that lead them to other religions.

They may contradict each other in their particulars, but not necessarily in their basic components (as I pointed out in the previous response). However, can science and the observations of well trained men not do the same? Having spent time working as a researcher, I can say with certainty that scientific experience -and any experience, in general- is subject to the same criticism that is being leveled here. Indeed, many mathematical theories have generated fierce debate and dogmatic followings, scientific systems have also claimed to be the only and most explanatory system of a subset or part of some observable phenomena while all the others are not. This criticism is a problem for mankind -a fallible creature who fancies his observations and feelings to be tantamount to the truth and beauty found in a mathematical proof.

3)

Memories change over time. Powerful religious experiences are often not recorded clearly and specifically until long after they’ve occurred. Especially when a story is retold several times, its main points tend to be increasingly emphasized and then exaggerated over time. The memory itself will change accordingly

So what? I mean, I don’t think this objection differs from the last one. It still relies on fragility, which runs the gamut in science and any system that requires some type of consistent dogma or testability (the sad thing is that in science and other “testable” studies, they just falsify data or twist it to where it does not need to change as per it is always a lie). Again fallibility does not mean that the experience that was actualized in the first instance was not an actual representation of some proof or personally-derived evidence for God.

4)

Confirmation Bias causes us to remember the experiences that confirm our beliefs. We tend to forget all the times we prayed or “had impressions” and nothing remarkable happened. We also go through so many experiences, that what seem like amazing coincidences are actually very likely to occur occasionally. If those seemingly amazing coincidences confirm our beliefs in some way, you can bet that story will be remembered and shared.

Psychologists have long proven that the tenants of confirmation bias extend into virtually every facet of human thought. Scientists, and the layman, are both subject to this vexing characteristic of the human mind. Professors defend, until their last breath, outmoded philosophical systems, archaic scientific theories, or even things that are contradicted. This is not a problem that would remove any evidence derived from experiences that we might have. This is especially true given that since all religious experience is a particular type of empirical observation, the truth value of those observations is not directly knowable to those who could not have participated in the experience. Thus, it follows, that levying any criticism against an experience by labeling it as confirmation bias may just as well apply to the critic as well as the criticized, and the result is an unwarranted and unfruitful deduction that leads to a dead-end.

5)

Even very spiritual people are often wrong. Even blessings from Apostles sometimes do not come to pass.

Its not about being right as it is about proof. People can be wrong in instances, and that does not mean that the general conclusion that is their faith, is equally wrong. If that were true, then I don’t know how we could read any book on physics and remain confident that basic theories like gravitational forces exist. This is irrelevant from the point of the article.

The conclusion:

All of this is to say that spiritual experiences are not surprising. In order for evidence to provide strong confirmation of a theory, the evidence must be different than what we would otherwise expect. Given what we know about human psychology, most spiritual experiences do not meet this standard, and hence do not provide strong confirmation of either the Gospel of the existence of God. I conclude that religious experiences, although powerful, are not reliable guides to truth. I am all for seeking after and having spiritual experiences in our lives, and I try to nurture myself spiritually (meaning mentally and emotionally) as well. But when determining the nature of physical reality, I think that reliable, repeatable, and verifiable evidence should definitely have precedence.

The second sentence of this conclusion is false. Why would a theory have to be subject to alternate expectations in order to be confirmable? That is not a necessary condition for confirmability in any regard. We can have expectations that some outcome X possess properties Y; we could even test X to get Y, and this would not effect confirmability. Actually, a theory has to have the following conditions to warrant it as true (and confirmable): A theory must exhibit consistency (it cannot cause contradictions in other theories upon which it relies), theories must be testable either empirically or rationally, and a theory must be logically possible. Spiritual experiences may not in their particular accounts meet any rigorous definition of theory, but their general implication may. That is not to say that particular instances of experiential claims are not important, it just means that they may be outside testability or may be subject to human fragilities and, thus, are unable to meet certain standard due to explanatory barriers. However, that does not defraud or remove them from being types of evidence -even if the degree is low.

The declaration at the end, “But when determining the nature of physical reality, I think that reliable, repeatable, and verifiable evidence should definitely have precedence” makes a nice point. Indeed, I think that no theist would debate this, for I am confident that a theist would argue that the physical reality with which this author is dealing is limited to the observable universe only. He would have to agree that his perceptions cause that reliability holds only the the limits of what it is that he senses, wants, and can physically test; he would have to assent to the claim that the Problem of Induction renders repetition in testing nothing more than a game of Russian Roulette with respect to verifiability and truth generation. Not to mention the large amount of faith that one must have in the physical extensions of mankind.

We know that the observable universe is not all there is. We know by way of basic mathematics that dimensions exist, in vast complexity, outside of our ability to directly experience them. The same system of mathematics which has proved this and provided the language scientists use on a daily basis has also proven logically that there must be a world among all possible dimensions in which a being that possesses all potentials exists. Moreover, by probability theory the chances that all things that we witness and perceive of were the act of pure random outcomes is so small that, when speaking of rationality, I have better odds of believing that a unicorn will bring me a leprechaun who will grant me three wishes while I feast in Valhalla with Odin on a six-sided square table.

[1] Written between 1962 and 1968, Campbell’s four-volume work The Masks of God covers mythology from around the world, from ancient to modern. Where The Hero with a Thousand Faces focused on the commonality of mythology (the “elementary ideas”), the Masks of God books focus upon historical and cultural variations the monomyth takes on (the “folk ideas”). In other words, where The Hero with a Thousand Faces draws perhaps more from psychology, the Masks of God books draw more from anthropology and history. Campbell also expounds on common elements of symbolism and belief structures present in virtually every culture and religious system dating back to the ancient world.

The fear of death is merely fear of the unknown, but on a larger scale. The natural reaction to the unknown is to irrationally over anticipate undesired outcomes; this tendency has consumed atheists by blinding them to the alternatives that are more probable, and far more reasonable. 
 

Recently there has been much talk about resource scarcity, population growth, and environmental degradation; the extent of the standard conversation ranges along the lines of perceived problems and limitations. So, people will often say things like: the price of oil is going up because there is less oil, or they will often complain about the blight of poverty increasing given that there are too many poor people, the rich are consuming to much, or that there are not sufficient natural resources. People who engage such ideas usually succumb to immediate and intellectually myopic solutions that take the course of pithy economic reasoning. Some of these solutions involve pointing out the fact that given consumption and distribution problems related to a perceived population increase, we should limit births, or that we should ensure some type of distribution system to slow down the income differentials in such a way so as to create social and economic equality.

These solutions and considerations are not new. Indeed, since about the 1820′s talk of  population excess was already running swiftly through political economy and philosophy.  Thomas Robert Malthus’  famous treatise, An Essay on the Principle of Population, argued that the dangers of population growth would preclude endless progress towards a utopian society: “The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man”. Malthus wrote several editions of his work (six editions if memory serves me). Malthus attempted to update and respond to the many criticisms of his position; the most prophetic and, perhaps powerful, response that Malthus exhibited was his point regarding the enviable limitation of war, physical allments, and poor distribution systems. His exact point is seemingly  poignant:

The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and tens of thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world

My purpose of writing this post is not to provide an analysis of Malthusian thought in general, but to respond to what I call “neomalthusianism”. If you want a glimpse into neomaltusianism take a look here.

The two basic propostions that neomalthusians take up are as follows:

1) There is a a limit to economic growth. This limit is achieved largely by excess and over-consumption of natural resources.

2) Population overgrowth will eventually outpace technology and, thus, cause famine and pestilence.

Regardless of the metaphysics associated with limited resources and exponential growth,  the malthusian world view is problematic given that (2) fails to account for how technology advances and that the human mind is, in-and-of-itself, a resource of infinite potential and capacity. For example, Marx and Engles predicted that science would solve the problem of an inadequate food supply by altering growing conditions, energy availability, and distribution inefficiencies; we see that Marx and Engles got the general idea correct: the mind can create solutions for any economic problem. Basically, to solve any serious economic problem, we need the most valuable resource of all: human  minds. The solution-generating ability of the sciences and abstractions of the philosophers are only possible with the continued proliferation of more human minds.

Additionally, the neomalthusian ignores supporting empirical evidence for increased population influencing how fast and in what way science advances. Indeed, Ester Boserup wrote in her book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure, that population levels determine agricultural methods, rather than agricultural methods determining population (via food supply). A major point of her book is that “necessity is the mother of invention”. Ester’s point is extremely important because it demonstrates how innovation tends to actualize itself. Innovation is conditional, it depends upon a set of circumstances that drive necessity. This ‘necessity’ is the main claim behind Nassim Taleb’s recent conception of market fragility, in which the market is to be considered an anti-fragile object such that when it breaks, it strengthens -or, think of the clasasical Nietzschen conception of, “what does not destroy me, only makes me stronger”. So, even if we had exponential growth, and no natural celling (holding capacities) or Batman-like Gradient, we would merely become more motivated , as a species and as individuals, to innovate and evolve.

Neomathusaism also ignores some basic economic facts: incentives effect behavior. Case in point, Julian Simon one of the many economists who has challenged the Malthusian catastrophe, cites that there are two conditions that cause (1) to fail; first, the existence of new knowledge, and educated people to take advantage of it, and second,  ”economic freedom”, that is, the ability of the world to increase production when there is a profitable opportunity to do so. It is important to note that profitability is a product of human action, it moves with consumers; nix the consumers (and producers), you nix the profit motive and some of the innovation incentive. You add to the pool of possible consumers, you increase the incentives, and thus the possible innovations that may come to fruition. Now, in conjunction with Julian Simion’s point, it behooves us to address the common soapbox of “the free markets causes a malthusian catastrophe”. First, the free market, or the market being liberalized, has caused more wealth and better standards of living for the greatest number of people than any other human event since the birth of fire.

There is no good reason to fall back on the malthusian crux. His theory has been, and will continue to be, defeated and proven false by the actions of free men. I think Tolstoy had it right when he exclaimed:

It would seem as though they were scientific deductions, which had nothing in common with the instincts of the masses. But this can only appear so for the man who believes that science, like the Church, is something self contained, liable to no errors, and not simply the imaginings of weak and erring folk, who merely substitute the imposing word ‘science,’ in place for the thoughts and words of people, for the sake of impressiveness.

There has been significant uproar in the news involving the quintessential philosophical dilemma that seems to haunt mankind: how much money should a man make, and how much should he give back? These questions are based upon the debated conception that there is a point at which having too much money is morally impermissible, or, similarly, that if someone has to much money (note the assumption), then said person must have obtained it by fraudulent or otherwise questionable means.

I, personally, find this type of idea, in all its forms, absurd. I think it demonstrates a serious lack of reasoning, but I will refrain from demonstrating why in this particular post. It is important to discover where this type of reasoning thinking comes from. Basically, we are dealing with an emotional justification. The idea that some person may have so much money that it is almost impossible that they spend it all, generates a type of resentment in most people. This resentment is not justified, however. That is because the resentment that is being created is contingent upon the assumption that a person should not have more than the individual thinker thinks they should have. The assumption is subjective; that is, that there is a point at which I think that a person should not have more money than they have, or that if they keep more than I think that they should keep, then they are acting immorally given that some people do not have even the basic amount of money for which to survive. The oversight is apparent when looking at the instance from a rights perspective. If we consider the fact that any one wealthy person has a right to that which they have justly earned, and that any imposition of our assumptions of wealth-limitations on them, would require that they lose certain rights while we, those who demand, gain rights, then we see that we are not only creating a condition that establishes a blatant contradiction of rights equality, but a violation of natural economic incentives.

The economic incentives that are violated relate to the idea that those who can produce will do so if and only if they are able to translate their productive powers into a vehicle that carries them to a goal. If the goal is wealth, prestige, or recognition, then regardless of the regulatory structure, those goals will be obtained. The only change is the way in which the producer will seek the actualization and completion of those goals. This is where the black market forces take action. Basically, if we demand that the rich be limited on how much they make, then there is an incentive not to make as much by either lowering their productive capacity, or by distorting their productive output (hiding their income). Both of the later options are what I call natural reactions to regulatory pressures -especially, tax pressures. Also, the risk that is waged regarding the concept that the rich lose rights because they now cannot have the same right to their property given the conditional: if I earn more, then more of my property is taken; whereas if I earn less, then less of my property is taken, deals with the fact that the producers might leave or stop producing. Not to mention the simple fact that the cost for getting into the market are higher that the cost of not entering the market; this entails that we would experience lower entrepreneurship and less innovation.

I believe that moral values are what dictate this phenomena of the wealthy producers avoiding taxation and regulation via the black market, and the people demanding that the wealthy producers surrender their property in the name of need. One is based on transcribing envy over a natural phenomena, and the other a justified action to avoid force. Thus, my question: Do certain moral values complement economic growth?